Virtue Epistemology

I read up on it a little bit. My perspective is influenced by my understanding of Wilfrid Sellars, hopefully people who understand his work better than I do wouldn't think I'm far off the mark. I think saying knowledge is belief “out of intellectual virtue” is insightful but insufficient. Sellars says that to know something is to be able to give justifications for it. In his commentary on Sellars's work, Robert Brandom says that this means you can show your belief is the conclusion of a “reliability inference,” which is an inference that your dispositions to express belief are reliable. So it could be reliability is an intellectual virtue. But Sellars says you must also know your dispositions are reliable, that they're "symptoms" of real conditions. I think you could also see the reliability inference as a specification of the circumstances under which a belief should be accepted which you have to make in order to make criticism possible, which seems important since Sellars later says that a rational epistemic practice is self-correcting. In that case, it seems to me that the way beliefs work in "the game of giving and asking for reasons" is important, not just the traits of the reporter.