Critique of Pure Reason

Prolly won't read the first critique soon but I plan on reading the PROLEGOMENA this summer! Will post thoughts here.

That is exactly what he is thinking. Kant thinks that all thinking subjects, as such thinking subjects, would utilize the same categories of judgment, largely because these are the forms of thought as such, and hence if they didn't utilize them, they wouldn't be thinking beings. But something like this doesn't hold with sensible intuition. An other being could conceivably not subject the content of its experience to the same a priori intuitions (which are the internal intuition of time and the external intuition of space, for us), since those forms of sensibility don't seem to be necessary conditions for any sort of sensible intuition as such. The inverse also holds. So we might find non-rational animals that share the same forms of sensibility, even though they don't have the ability of discursive thought, and hence don't have the categories of judgment to structure their experience into knowledge. The former is an objectionable view, largely because it's unclear how it fits in with the ideality of the a priori intuitions (which might not be discursive, concepts, but they are still not merely psychological elements).

Oh, and Flo, definitely feel free to use this thread for Prolegomena thoughts. No reason this thread has to be restricted to just the First Critique.